I the e isiti g of Du khei s hu a is i e ent years, attention has been drawn to his theory of moral individualism and the usefulness of his argument that a reformed democratic capitalism can reconcile individual freedom with collective constraint. Here I investigate Du khei s u de sta di g of the elatio ship et ee i di idual a d so iet in greater detail, showing in the process that his thinking was ambiguous and inconsistent.
Durkheim's humanism
In the revival of Durkheim scholarship in recent years, two prominent themes stand out.
One is the reconstruction of Durkheim as an action theorist, for whom social reality is an emergent property of collective practices (Rawls 1996 (Rawls , 2001 (Rawls , 2003 (Rawls , 2012 . The other is the e lai i g of Du khei s theo of o al i di idualis as a a tidote to Fou auldian cynicism and a restatement of the unfinished project of liberal-communitarian humanism (Joas 2008 (Joas , 2013 Cladis 1992a Cladis , 1992b Callegaro 2012; Lukes and Prabhat 2012; Hodgkiss 2013) . While the former arouses some interesting epistemological questions, the latter carries a more obvious ethical attraction, claiming as it does to have found a reassuring harmony between the belief in human dignity and the highly differentiated yet interdependent character of global modernity.
Although both intepretations of Durkheim can be accused of glossing over contradictions in his thinking, it is the i o siste ies i Du khei s understanding of the individual which interest me here. In what follows I will detail the te sio s i Du khei s theory of the individual in order to challenge the idea that there is a straightforward moral or cultural remedy for the pathological forms of individualism that afflict Western societies.
There are, as we shall see, fundamental dis epa ies i Du khei s theory of the relationship between individual and society, but in my view these discrepancies are testimony to the way the structural contradictions of capitalist societies produce forms of identity and legitimising concepts of the self that both conflict with, and impair, the ideal of moral individualism.
Social facts and the collective good
In The Rules of Sociological Method [1895] Durkheim made the novel claim that social phenomena should e studied s ie tifi all , as e te al thi gs , existing as stable realities deta hed f o the o s ious ei gs ho fo thei o e tal ep ese tatio s of the .
So ial fa ts ha e a p ope t of esista e , he famously wrote, exerting a oe i e a d o st ai i g po e supe io to the i di idual s o s ious ess a d ill, and constituting a fo e of e essit that is ofte i elu ta le . (Durkheim 1982: 52, 70) In the standard positivist reading of this work, Durkheim was advancing a dualistic analysis, in which the strength of the individual and that of society are inversely related. The function of social facts is thus to hold the anti-social tendencies of the individual in check so as to maintain social order. This has ee alled Du khei s o tai e odel of so iet . Su h is a container distinguished from the things it o tai s. Sto e a d Fa e a :
As a kind of inverted complement to this dualism, Durkheim also distinguished those social facts made visible by the hard-won Cartesian rigour of the social scientist, from the s he ati , su a ep ese tatio s hi h o stitute the p e otio s that e e plo i our nor al a of life . The latte a e the spo ta eous ut u satisfa to p odu t of an ideologi al a al sis whose dependence on the illusions of common sense is the atu al i li atio of ou i d . In order to study the social forces that denature the individual, in othe o ds, so iologists ust e e se a p o ess that is itself a atu al i li atio -they must throw off the yoke of beliefs i ested ith a ki d of as e da a d autho it a d
hose esista e [ e feel] he e seek to f ee ou sel es f o the : -3).
This familiar su a of Du khei s ea l positi is does need qualifying, however.
Perhaps surprisingly, Durkheim made a point of distancing himself from the pessimistic positions of Hobbes and Rousseau. For them, he says, there is an erroneous break in o ti uit et ee the i di idual a d so iet , ith the a ti-social nature of the individual making some form of external control an artificial but necessary requirement of social order 
Positive solidarity
Du khei s allusio to a positive solida it returns us to the role of shared conceptions of the good. In pre-industrial societies positive solidarity originated from the strength of the olle ti e o s ie e -common sentiments and values which dominated the individual to the extent that novel or divergent acts were a rarity. The collective conscience is certainly internalised, but the effect of this internalisation is to suppress the individual more tho oughl tha a pu el e te al fo e ould do. I so ieties he e this t pe of solidarity is prominent, the i di idual does ot appea ; ou i di idualit is il (1964: 130) .
This solida it , Du khei asse ts, a g o o l i i e se atio to pe so alit : .
As societies develop, however, and processes of differentiation break down the bonds of likeness, the collective o s ie e e o es fee ler a d ague , o e a st a t a d o e i de isi e (1964: 171), and its socially integrating power declines. What seems to take its place is the diversification of roles and functions whose interconnectedness engenders a positive sense of cohesion. It is, then, the di isio of la ou hi h, o e a d more, fills the role that was formerly filled by the common conscience. It is the principal o d of so ial agg egates of highe t pes 1964: 173).
I de oti g se e al hapte s to pathologi al fo s of the di isio of la ou , Du khei a k o ledged the e e e e eptio al a d a o al i u sta es i hi h this solidarity was deficient. A division of labour that changes or accelerates too rapidly, which is too discontinuous to allow the stabilisation of activities and exchanges, or which separates the worker too dramatically from the owner, and the owner too greatly from the consumer, leads to u ealisti a o i e pe tatio s, so ial conflict and economic crises. A division of la ou hi h is fo ed athe tha spo ta eous , hi h ep odu es hie a hies of so ial p i ilege a d i he ited ealth i stead of ei g o stituted, e ito ati all , i su h a a that social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities , also auses conflict and disunity by violating the modern moral principle of fair exchange. These deviant forms are then o t asted ith the solida it that a ises f o the di isio of la ou i its atu al state:
For, normally, the role of each special function does not require that the individual close himself in, but that he keep himself in constant relations with neighbouring functions, take conscience of their needs, of the changes which they undergo, etc. Durkheim made some attempt to resolve this anomolie by attributing the opposing tendencies to chronological stages of development. The individual first emerges from the decline in olle ti e su eilla e that results from the growing density and diversity of social interactions. Following this initial liberation, the sphe e of f ee a tio of ea h individual is extended in fact, and, little by little, the fa t e o es a ight . At so e poi t the de a ds of the i di idual pe so alit e d e ei i g the o se atio of usto : 299). What was originally experienced as a egati e f eedo f o the o st ai ts of the collective conscience, crystallises into a positive moral obligation and a f eedo to ; it is transformed into a e li el se se of espe t fo hu a dig it , to hi h e a e supposed to o fo as u h i ou elatio s ith ou sel es as i ou elatio s ith othe s : . O i Callega o s o ds: so iet as a hole is ot a constraining force, but the precondition for unde sta di g the e hu a it of i di iduals (Callegaro 2012: 467) .
Even on this subject, however, Durkheim was ambivalent. In his account of the progress of organic solidarity, for example, he qualified his approval of the g o i g espe t of society for the i di idual a i g that this si ple g o th of st e gth a ot o pe sate fo the ultiple, se ious losses that e ha e o se ed :
The Division of Labour closes with the assertion that moral individualism binds the individual to the collective -The duties of the i di idual to a ds hi self a e, i ealit , duties to a ds so iet . The o espo d to e tai olle ti e se ti e ts hi h he a ot offe d
(1964: 399) -earlier in the same text Durkheim had made exactly the opposite assessment, reinvoking an atomistic individualism at war with the collective good.
We erect a cult in behalf of personal dignity which, as every strong cult, already has its superstitions. It is thus, if one wishes, a common cult, but it is possible only by the ruin of all others, and, consequently, cannot produce the same effects as this multitude of extinguished beliefs. There is no compensation for that. Moreover, if it is common in so far as the community partakes of it, it is individual in its object. If it tu s all ills to a ds the sa e e d, this e d is ot so ial…It is still f o so iet that it takes all its force, but it is not to society that it attaches us; it is to ourselves.
Hence, it does not constitute a true social link. That is why we have been justly able to reproach the theorists who have made this sentiment exclusively basic in their moral doctrine, with the ensuing dissolution of society. (1964: 172, my emphasis)
Negative and positive freedom
The same tension between a negative and a positive conception of individual freedom is evident in the lectures developed by Durkheim at Bordeaux between 1890 and 1900, which were subsequently published and translated as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (1992) .
Here Durkheim emphasised the important role the state has played in liberating the individual from the grip of common norms and institutions, delivering the same negative freedom that the British liberal philosophers associated, in contrast, with the minimal state.
It is the State that has rescued the child from patriarchal domination and from family tyranny; it is the State that has freed the citizen from feudal groups and later from communal groups; it is the State that has liberated the craftsman and his master from guild tyranny. :
The state is li e ati g e ause, i holdi g its o stitue t so ieties i check, it prevents them from exerting the repressive influences over the individual that they ould othe ise e e t : -3). The zero-sum relationship of individual and society see s i es apa le i Du khei s easo i g here: it is the State that redeems the individual from society : , my emphasis). Hence also Durkheim s a gu e t that increasing respect for the individual, and the corollary desire to avoid or minimise his or her suffering, reflects a weakening of the collective conscience whose transgression no longer generates passionate outrage and violence against persons.
The decline in the rate of homicide at the present day has not come about because respect for the human person acts as a brake on the motives for homicide or on the stimulants to murder, but because these motives and these stimulants grow fewer in number and have less intensity. These stimulants are the very collective sentiments that bind us to objects which are alien to humanity and the individual, that is, which bind us to groups or to things that are a symbol of these groups. (1992: 117) There is a second conception of individual freedom offered in Professional Ethics, however, which is positi e . This conception stresses the role of the state in actively promoting the moral faculties of reason, responsibility and self-discipline whose cultivation Durkheim (1961) argued, in his Sorbonne lectures of 1902-3, should be the primary concern of a secular education system. This conception argues that the moral content of contractual relations does not reside in freedom from constraint, but rather in the o t a ti g pa ties adherence to collective definitions of value, price and just desert (1992: 208-11) . To ensure this positi e f eedo to , the ole of the state is ot si pl to fe d off the opposi g fo es that tend to absorb the individual: it also serves to provide the milieu in which the individual moves, so that he a de elop his fa ulties i f eedo : . In this sense the state functions as a kind of figurehead for the pri iples of o al i di idualis , its fu da e tal dut ei g to p ese e i alli g the i di idual to a o al a of life : .
Homo duplex
In How curious, then, that in The Dualis of Human Nature and its Social Co ditio s calls the p e-so ial i di idual; that is, to the utilitarian idea of the naturally egoistic self which must be tamed and controlled for the sake of social order. This control, admittedly, is theorised as something internalised; but the social forces that are internalised still remain at war with the biological instincts that pre-empt them. Durkheim thus conceptualises the human person as internally divided -homo duplex -et ee se so appetites that a e e essa il egoisti a d ha e ou i di idualit a d it alo e as thei o je t , a d the The origin of the antagonism that we have described is evident from the very nature of the elements involved in it. The conflicts of which we have given examples are between the sensations and the sensory appetites, on the one hand, and the intellectual and moral life, on the other; and it is evident that passions and egoistic tendencies derive from our individual constitutions, while our rational activitywhether theoretical or practical -is dependent on social causes. (1973b: 162) This is, in a way, a o e sophisti ated ps hologi al e sio of the o tai e odel of society that seemed to pla a e t al ole i Du khei s early positivism. Later in the chapter on anomic suicide, attempting to explain why married womenunlike married men -do not seem to be more prone to anomic suicide in societies where divorce has become sufficiently widespread to have weakened the moral institution of marriage, Durkheim exposes again the contradiction in his thinking:
Wo e s se ual eeds ha e less of a e tal ha a te e ause, ge erally speaking, her mental life is less developed. These needs are more closely related to the needs of the organism, following rather than leading them, and consequently find in them an efficient restraint. Being a more instinctive creature than man, woman has only to follow her instincts to find calmness and peace. She thus does not require so strict a social regulation as marriage, and particularly as monogamic marriage. (1951: 272) It is the e tal ha a te of desi es, i othe o ds, a d ot thei i sti ti e nature, which renders them susceptible to over-excitation. And since the mind is the repository of society, it is quite logical that it is society which is responsible for this overexcitation, this surplus of desire. Hence Durkheim does not e plai o e s less de eloped e tal life th ough iologi al edu tio is , ut i pli it efe e e to the a women in the nineteenth-century were denied independent access to the public sphere of politi s a d lea i g. Wo a kills he self less… ot because of physiological differences f o a ut e ause she does ot pa ti ipate i olle ti e life i the sa e a . :
; see also , A d e ause the o a does ot e ui e so st i t a so ial egulatio as a iage , the t pe of sui ide ost common among married women is of a different sort -that de i i g f o e essi e egulatio , that of pe so s ith futu es pitilessl lo ked a d passio s iole tl hoked opp essi e dis ipli e : ; see also 189).
Hence for men, in Durkhei s a al sis, it is lea l ot o ot just a deficit in i ilisatio , ut athe hypercivilisation hi h eeds the a o i te de : , e phasis . The lo gi g fo i fi it is dail ep ese ted as a a k of o al disti tio , Durkheim co plai s of so iet s olle ti e o sessio ith boundless novelty, innovation and excess, further demonstrating his conviction that moral and ideological forces can e ge de pathologi al as ell as feli itous desi es. The do t i e of the ost uthless a d s ift p og ess has e o e a a ti le of faith. :
As soon as men are inoculated with the precept that their duty is to progress, it is harder to make them accept resignation; so the number of the malcontent and disquieted is bound to increase. The entire morality of progress and perfection is thus inseparable from a certain amount of anomy. (1951: 364) If so iet i o ulates people ith the idea -with a e ti e o alit -that it is their dut to p og ess, the it lea l akes o se se to sa , as Durkheim (1973b: 162) 
Egoism
Si ila te sio s a e appa e t i Du khei s dis ussion of egoistic suicide. Egoism apparently arises from weak social bonds and insufficient involvement in collective life. The effect of this e essi e i di idualis is to ake human mortality intolerable by fostering existential dou ts hi h de se so ial ties, i teg ati g i di iduals o e p ofou dl i to sup aindividual sentiments and p a ti es, a othe ise hold i a e a e. Whe , the efo e, e have no other object than ourselves we cannot avoid the thought that our efforts will finally e d i othi g ess, si e e ou sel es disappea . : Durkheim himself acknowledged the moral debt we owe to this religious tradition, noting that toda it ould e sa ilege fo a a to de p og ess a d flout the hu a isti ideal to hi h ode so ieties a e atta hed , this sa ed ideal ei g the u tou ha le p i iple of f ee e ui : . As Pa so s i sisted: pursue their sovereign ends. Although Durkheim was susceptible to reproducing this idea of a atu al o p e-so ial i di idual hose i satia le a d ego e t i desi es e plai ed the need for society to exert a moderating and constraining influence, the chief insight attributed to him by Parsons, as well as by Giddens (1971) , was his more radical assertion that the i di idual -e e i di idual, a d e e fo of i di idualis -is already the creation of society.
Suicide and social meaning
Further indication that egoism and anomie are socially constructed forms of selfhood comes from Douglas s asse tio that Durkheim understood suicide to be an act loaded with social meanings. That the meaning of suicide is social rather than individual is apparent from the o eptual ethodolog of Du khei s stud , and the way he constructed a typology of suicide that is richly suggestive of the sentiments and motives of those who take their own li es. These t pes -Du khei e e o o s We e s he e euti otio of the ideal t pe : -make sense to the reader because they articulate with understandings of suicide that are already part of public culture. And this is no accident, because Durkheim himself constructed his categories out of well-established social understandings, with egoism and anomie (though the latter term was not in common usage) already part of both commonsense and more technical views of the moral malaise of the age (Douglas 1970: 17-18 ).
The attitude of melancholic languor and meditative self-absorption that Durkheim associates with egoistic suicide, for example, is constructed using the description of the Even coroners, as Atkinson (1971) showed, participate in the transmission of these social meanings, employing social understandings of the kinds of circumstances under which people might want to kill themselves in order to distinguish suicide from accidental death.
I Douglas s i te p etatio of Du khei , the efo e, it is ot the la k of so ial meaning -o less ess -which causes suicide, but rather particular social meanings which become dominant over others. Douglas thus treats egoism, anomie, altruism and fatalism as olle ti e ep ese tatio s , s oli a ati es that o p ise the pools of ea i g that i di iduals utilise to ake se se of thei li es. The ep ese t, a o di g to 
Base and superstructure
This critical exegesis of Du khei s o k has shown that his understanding of the relationship between individual and society was contradictory and inconsistent. Though he flirted with the idea that society creates, rather than just constrains, the individual, his conviction that capitalism needed to be reformed rather than replaced meant his analysis stopped short of a full exploration of how egoistic and anomic forms of individualism were a normal product of the market society, while the ideological spectre of the naturally egoistic, p e-so ial i di idual o ti ued to hau t his easo i g. German-Jewish financiers as middlemen, and in doing so stoking the anti-semitic paranoia that would soon claim Dreyfus, he bribed bankers, journalists, and hundreds of members of parliament to suppress the truth and support a government-backed lottery loan that was still not enough to save the doomed venture. More than 800,000 small French investors were ruined when the Panama Canal Company was declared bankrupt in 1889. Over 20,000 labourers on the project had already lost their lives to accidents and disease. According to Arendt (1973: 95-6) , the full exposure of the scandal revealed, at est, that the e e s of Parliament and civil servants had become business e , and worse, that politics was dege e ati g i to ga gste is . Back in England, Trollope was reflecting on the spread of this new moral creed of extravagant and ruthless individualism. Mel otte s ha a te , he explained in his autobiography, was i te ded to sho ho a certain class of dishonesty, dishonesty magnificent in its proportions, and climbing into high places, has become at the same time so rampant and so splendid that there seems to be reason for fearing that men and women will be taught to feel that dishonesty, if it can become splendid, will cease to be Moral individualism may therefore be a noble and worthy goal, but the ideas most likely to promote or retard its advance will be those that offer a purchase on the obstacles and conflicts of a more troublesome reality. In this society, even more tha i Du khei s,
I noted at the beginning how in The Rules
one cannot be a rational moral agent without complicity in an irrational and immoral world.
If Durkheim is still relevant to this world, as I believe he is, it is not because of the perfection of his ideas, but because their imperfections express the real contradictions with which we live. egois is ooted i the de li e of st u tu ed so ial o ds o i ed ith so ial values p o oti g i di idualis , pe so al i itiati e a d espo si ilit , p edi ta l asso iates alues hi h pla e st ess upo o a ti lo e ith egois , si e the pla e the o us o each individual to search out and win a partner through his own efforts . Co pa e this to
Ho khei e s a gu e t that the o a ti o st u tio of the o a as atu all passionate, while undoubtedly ideological, also allowed her to defy the egocentric logic of e o o i atio alit : it e a led he to a oid edu tio to o je t-status and thus to represent, amid an evil society, another possibility. In the passage from the old serfdom to the new she could be regarded as a representation of nature, which eluded utilitarian al ulatio . Ho khei e :
3 Rawls (2003: 302) argues, against the theory that associates moral individualism with the collective conscience, that Durkheim understood collective beliefs to be dysfunctional to the modern di isio of la ou , ith a o ie a isi g f o a failu e to gi e up suffi ie t shared eliefs to allo fo the egulatio of p a ti e justi e athe tha elief . Though 'a ls akes u h of the ki ship et ee Du khei a d Ma , she isses Ma s i sight that capitalism can dispense with an ideological belief system descending from above (i.e. can dispe se ith the olle ti e o s ie e of eligious eliefs), precisely because it generates, sui generis, its own form concealment -the fantastic form of a relation between thingsthrough the circulation of commodities. It is participation in practices of exchange, in other words, that makes capitalism appear free, equal and just. (Marx 1976: 164-5, 279-80) 
